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1   The opinions expressed in this presentation are the personal views of the authors and do not prejudge deci-
sions of the Austrian regulatory authorities.  
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Abstract: 
The telecommunications markets in the European Union have gone through a period of rapid 
technological as well as economic change. After the market opening in the late 1990s, the 
approach to regulate these markets has likewise changed over time. Whereas a sector-
specific framework dominated the phase from 1998-2002, a more prominent role of competi-
tion law regulating telecommunications markets has become visible within the last years. The 
two reviews of the regulatory framework (2002 and 2010) have seen sector-specific 
measures being scaled back and competition law measures gaining a more prominent role.  
This paper tries to analyse the development from sector-specific regulation towards competi-
tion law in its application to telecommunications markets in the EU. It draws conclusions from 
the changes in the different reviews and demonstrates how these modifications of the 
framework have taken place. Additionally, the practical implementations are analysed with 
respect to two countries. Despite the fact, that EU member states are following a joint ap-
proach (EU framework), there are still differences on the national level as regards the appli-
cation of regulatory instruments and the regulation of specific markets. This can be demon-
strated by looking at how national regulatory authorities conduct the process of for example 
market definition, market analysis, SMP designation and levying of remedies. In the paper 
Germany and Austria are analysed, two neighbouring countries, with similar principles in the 
transposition of EU frameworks into national legislation, but with strongly different outcomes 
as regards specific regulatory measures in terms of e.g. market analysis, price regulation, 
organisation of the regulatory authorities etc. Thereby we demonstrate that although the EU 
framework tends to achieve harmonisation, there are still a number of differences between 
member states in practical implementation. 
The paper is organised as follows: after the introduction in section 1, section 2 draws the 
picture of the development of the most important elements of the EU regulatory framework 
over time. Thereby. we specifically look at the issues of market definition, analysis and domi-
nance designation but also issues of access and interconnection are analyzed. This encom-
passes conclusions regarding the overall trends of development in the design of the EU 
regulatory framework. Section 3 analyses the corresponding developments in the Austrian 
and the German telecommunications act, especially with respect to the “balance” between 
the role of sector-specific regulation and competition law in national legislation. This is done 
be looking at some specific topics such as 
•  market definition and analysis  
•  organization of the regulatory authority  
•  potential conflicts between regulatory authority and competition authority regarding 
competences and responsibilities, 
•  possibilities of enforcement, and 
•  the treatment of margin squeeze 
Section 4 contains our conclusions with respect to the practical implementation in member 
states against the overall goal of harmonisation and demonstrates differences in the way EU 
legislation has been transposed to national legislation in a comparison between Germany 
and Austria.  
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The topic of this paper stems from the increasing competitiveness of telecommunications 
markets after more than a decade of competition in the EU as of today. As incumbents have 
lost market shares and alternative suppliers gain an increasing foothold, the question arises 
whether the legal and regulatory framework is following these trends by scaling back the sec-
tor-specific regulation and increasing the applicability of competition law. 
Given the fact that telecommunications markets have always been influenced by the con-
cepts that are derived from sector specific regulation and competition law one can ask 
whether and to which extent the relevance of sector specific regulation decreases when 
competition becomes sustainable. A further question is then whether this is a trend in all EU 
countries and thus if the relevant EU frameworks are implemented in a similar fashion by 
transposition into national legislation or whether discrepancies remain. 
The history of telecommunications regulation and liberalisation of markets in Europe started 
more than 25 years ago in the late 1980s. The relationship between sector-specific regula-
tion and competition law emerged when the telecommunications markets in the EU member 
states were opened to competition, first in the mobile sector and (in most countries) as of 
1998 also in the fixed network. The process was initiated by the EU (starting with a green 
paper in 1993) which used its main mechanisms such as directives and recommendations in 
order to abolish special rights of public enterprises and to open up markets to competition. 
The first major process was the “1998 package” which served to “manage the transition from 
monopoly to competition”.
2  
A major revision came in 2003 with a new policy framework replacing the 1998 package and 
taking into consideration the competitive developments in the meantime. It comprised a 
package of directives which addressed specific aspects of importance for the sector espe-
cially with regard to issues like access
3, general authorizations
4 as well as the conditions 
                                                 
2   Details on the applicable initiatives and documents from the time are archived at http://www.ec.europa. 
eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/history/index_en.htm 
3   Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and inter-
connection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive),  OJ L 108, 
24.4.2002, pp. 7–20 
4   Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of 
electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), in:  OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 21–32.  
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which were compiled in the Framework Directive.
5 Already at that time especially also with 
the introduction of the recommendation on relevant product and services markets
6 which 
served as a “sample” of how to approach the definition and analysis of markets the frame-
work started to take into account the achieved competitive status in the EU. The most recent 
process of reforming the rules started in 2006 with the communication on the review of the 
EU regulatory framework for electronic communications and services
7. This was followed by 
several studies as well as an impact assessment which in the end of 2007 led to the first 
proposals on the revision of the regulatory framework.
8 One of the main conclusions was that 
the achievements in terms of competition as well as investment had been brought about by 
sector specific regulation, a statement that was intensively debated throughout the sector. 
Over time, an especially important aspect thereby was the balance between sector-specific 
regulation and competition law. This was already an issue in the 1998 package, but became 
more relevant in 2003 with the first recommendation on relevant product in services markets 
as well as the explanatory memorandum of the recommendation. This related to the “Com-
mission Guidelines on Market Analysis”
9. In this recommendation, the approach to market 
definition and analysis is contained and also a discussion about the approach to market 
analysis based on competition law principles. This recommendation has been modified in 
2007, a process resulting in a reduction in the number of markets susceptible to ex-ante reg-
ulation from 18 to 7 – which in itself is a sign that sector specific regulation could be scaled 
back. It is in this context an analysis of the future sharing of roles and balance between sec-
tor specific regulation and competition law comes into play. 
                                                 
5   See Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regu-
latory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), in: OJ L 108, 
24.4.2002, pp. 33–50 
6   Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the elec-
tronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication 
networks and services, in: OJ L 114 , 08/05/2003 pp. 45 - 49 
7   See http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUreServ.do?uri=CELEIX:52006dc0334:en:not 
8   In this respect especially the studies related to the review of the recommendation on markets subject to ex 
ante regulation (Stumpf, Cave, Valletti), “Preparing the Next Steps in Regulation in Electronic Communications 
– a Contribution to the Review of the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework” (Hogan & Hartson 
and Analyses) and “An Assessment of the Regulatory Framework  for Electronic Communications: Growth and 
Investment in the EU E-Communications Sector” (London Economics, PriceWaterhouseCoopers) were corner-
stones in developing the framework, see: 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/econm/library/ext_studies/index_en.htm. 
9  Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power under the Com-
munity Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, see: Official Journal 
C165, 11.7.2002, pp. 6-31.  
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2  Development of the EU Regulatory Framework (1998-2011) with re-
spect to sector specific regulation vs. competition law 
The purpose of this section is to look at the EU frameworks and cornerstones of their con-
tents as they developed from 1998 via 2002 to 2010 and to focus on the aspect of the role of 
competition law in the telecommunications sector where sector specific regulation exists.  
2.1  The 1998 framework 
2.1.1  Main elements of the regulatory framework and assessment of balance be-
tween sector specific regulation vs. competition law 
The 1998 framework was directed towards the initial market opening in most EU member 
states as of January 1, 1998 in the so-called “core area” of telecommunications, the fixed 
network. This package comprised different documents addressing a large number of areas 
such as data protection
10, licensing
11, open network provision, the adaptation to a competitive 
environment and telecommunications
12, interconnection
13, as well as number portability, car-
rier preselection, furthermore recommendations on interconnection and accounting separa-
tion, and additionally frameworks on leased lines (directive 94/44/EEC) and voice telephony 
(directive 98/10/EC).
14 At the time there was a clear picture that due to the monopolistic 
character of the markets, it would be necessary to take specific measures to introduce com-
petition and this comprised to apply sector-specific regulation and not to rely to a large extent 
on competition law as this was deemed inappropriate.  
Most of the documents relevant at the time and framing the overall picture of the 1998 pack-
age did not specifically address the issue of sector-specific regulation versus competition law 
but directly started to discuss sector-specific measures to open up the markets. The ultimate 
                                                 
10  Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the pro-
cessing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector, in:   OJ L 24, 
30.1.1998, pp. 1–8 
11  Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 April 1997 on a common framework 
for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of telecommunications services, in: Official Journal 
L 117 , 07/05/1997, pp. 15 - 27 
12  http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/dir97-51en.pdf 
13  Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in Tele-
communications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the princi-
ples of Open Network Provision (ONP), (31997L0033) Official Journal L 199, 26/07/1997 pp. 32 - 52 
14    All referenced documents can be found here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/Main-en.htm  
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goal was to achieve full competition and the selected measures are directed towards that 
goal.
15 However, there is also reference to the competition rules of the EU which apply in 
parallel.
16  
Looking at the literature and analysis, the relationship between sector specific regulation and 
competition law has always existed in the scientific analysis. The debate started already in 
1997 when the sector specific framework was effectively introduced. According to Riehmer
17 
the ONP rules as applied for the telecom sector cannot be regarded as competition rules 
which are applicable on the behaviour of governments or enterprises. The ONP rules and the 
competition rules thus are two different, though not conflicting set of rules. Thus, competition 
rules apply even if the ONP rules are fulfilled. In a review of more than a decade of open 
markets Lehofer
18 concludes that there is no clear trend from sector specific regulation to 
competition law but rather that competition law applied identically in all phases of the market, 
i.e. before, during or after a scaling back of sector specific regulation. Klotz is of the opinion 
that competition law and sector specific regulation are two sides of the same medal. Sector 
specific regulation tries to avoid negative consequences and abuse of market power in ad-
vance whereas competition law tries to correct developments which have taken place but 
have moved in the wrong direction.
19 
2.1.2  Design of key regulatory parameters between sector specific regulation and 
competition law 
The treatment of markets and consequences of “strong” market positions of single market 
players has been a relevant topic for decades not only in telecommunications.  
                                                 
15  In terms of access and interconnection, a commission recommendation was passed with two parts which de-
scribed how interconnection pricing should take place and how accounting separation and cost accounting 
should be done. The idea was to allow for certain instruments which enable competition to flourish and the 
measures were all sector-specific. 
16  One of the measures was that member states had to notify the EU commission every 6 months about the en-
terprises which enjoyed significant market power according to Article 18 of the Interconnection directive on one 
of the predefined markets (voice telephony (access / services), mobile telephony, leased lines and (later) inter-
connection). The publication of the list of SMP operators can be found at the archived EU homepage: 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/comm-en.htm#misc. 
17  See Riehmer: EG Wettbewerbsrecht und Zugangsvereinbarungen in der Telekommunikation – Die neue Mittei-
lung der Europäischen Kommission, in: Multimedia und Recht (MMR), 1998, p. 355. 
18  Lehofer, H.P.: Der Weg vom Sektorrecht zum allgemeinen Wettbewerbsrecht im Lichte der nationalen Recht-
sprechung, Notizen zu einem Vortrag beim 11. Salzburger Telekom-Forum, 27.8.2010, p. 9. 
19  Klotz, R.: Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation: Brauchen wir die ex-ante-Regulierung noch?, in: ZWeR no. 
3/2003, pp. 283-313.  
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2.1.2.1  Market definition, analysis and dominance designation 
Significant market power has not been the same as the concept of dominant position used in 
competition law. Significant market power was an ONP concept used to decide in which cas-
es an organisation should be subject to specific obligations, under specific ONP Directives. 
An organisation was presumed to have significant market power if it had a share of more 
than 25% of the relevant market. Typically, organisations needed to have much greater mar-
ket share than this before they were considered as having a dominant position on a market. 
A company may have been designated as having significant market power under ONP legis-
lation but not be considered to have a dominant position for the purposes of competition law; 
or a company may have a dominant position in a particular market segment but not be con-
sidered to have significant market power in the sense of the ONP concept.  
The major differences between the ONP approach and competition law concern the way the 
relevant market was defined, and the extent of an organisation’s influence on that market.
20 
The relevant market was always defined in terms of the product/service and the geographical 
market. The regulations based on Article 81 and 82 of the EC-Treaty
21 laid down the follow-
ing definitions to describe the relevant product market and the relevant geographical mar-
ket.
22 The relevant product market was defined as follows
23 
“A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are re-
garded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ 
characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”  
The relevant geographical market was defined as follows
24: 
“The relevant geographic market compromises the area in which the undertakings con-
cerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which the con-
ditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in 
those area.” 
                                                 
20  Determination of organizations with Significant Market Power (SMP) for implementation of the ONP Directives 
21  See e.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on com-
petition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, http://europa. eu/legislation_summaries 
/competition/firms/l26092_en.htm 
22  The relevant market within which to assess a given competition issue is therefore established by the combina-
tion of the product and geographic markets. 
23  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (97/C 
372/03) 
24 Ibid  
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To define the relevant market some basic principles had to be taken into consideration. Firms 
are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: demand side substitutability, 
supply side substitutability and potential competition. From an economic point of view, for the 
definition of the relevant market, demand side substitution constituted the most immediate 
and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product, in particular in relation to 
their pricing decisions. Basically, the exercise of market definition consisted of identifying the 
effective alternative sources for the customers of the undertakings involved, in terms both of 
products/services and of geographic location of suppliers. 
Supply-side substitutability may also have been taken into account when defining markets in 
those situations in which its results had been equivalent to those of demand substitution in 
terms of effectiveness and immediacy.
25  
Despite of the fact that a market share of more than 25% presumed significant market power, 
a market share of over 50% was usually sufficient to demonstrate dominance although other 
facts also will be examined. The meaning of the general principle that a market share of 
more than 25% presumed significant market power, has been shown in the Interconnection 
Directive
26. Article 4 defines significant market power as follows: 
“An organisation shall be presumed to have significant market power when it has a share 
of more than 25% of a particular telecommunications market in the geographical area in a 
Member State within which it is authorized to operate.” 
Therefore, the relevant product market was the particular telecommunications market and 
the relevant geographical market should be the area in a Member State in which the organi-
sation is authorized to operate. While the definition for the geographical market created no 
problem, the “particular telecommunications market” needed to be defined in more detail in 
those days.
27 The initial Interconnection Directive (97/33) identified different markets: (1) fixed 
public telephone network and fixed public telephone services, (2) leased lines services, (3) 
public mobile telephone network and public mobile telephone services. The parameters for 
measuring markets and market shares are not laid down in specific Directives.  
                                                 
25  This means that suppliers are able to change production to more relevant products / markets quickly without 
incurring significant additional costs or risks in response to small and permanent changes in relative prices. 
26  Initially 97/33/EG 
27  Nowadays the definition of the telecommunications market does not need to be discussed anymore as there 
are straight standards given by the European Commission.  
10 
2.1.2.2  Access and Interconnection 
Competition in telecommunications can in principle work based on services or on infrastruc-
ture. Service based competition (i.e. several market players offering services on the infra-
structure of one operator) can be achieved reasonably quickly, however, only infrastructure 
based competition can be regarded as sustainable as it builds on separate physical infra-
structure which strategically guarantee independence. 
As long as it is not realistic to expect independent infrastructure to be available due to the 
time lag from market opening until investment is undertaken and new networks are deployed 
and due to the fact that not all infrastructures may be realistically replicable, the EU frame-
work contained rules on access and interconnection. Access is the more encompassing and 
generic term comprising any one sided form of connecting networks including access to facil-
ities whereas as interconnection is a two-sided form of access aiming at exchanging traffic 
between two networks to enable communication between end users. The EU framework 
gave specific attention to this by ensuring that interconnection should be available, by defin-
ing interconnection as a separate market and by passing recommendations on cost account-
ing and cost calculation for interconnection services. The original EU framework did not con-
tain an obligation for unbundling. This was implemented in a number of member states, but 
the EU did not introduce such an element before the year 2000.
28 
2.2  The 2002 Review 
2.2.1  Main elements of the regulatory framework and assessment of balance be-
tween sector specific regulation vs. competition law 
In the period starting in 1998, market change became visible stepwise. Competitors gained 
market shares and markets started to perform better in terms of matching demand and sup-
ply. Also technical progress took place. In 2002, the framework was updated, to take account 
of developments in this fast-moving field. The frontiers that were gradually overcome referred 
to the separated markets for (voice) telephony, internet, and broadcast which had more and 
                                                 
28  See Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on 
unbundled access to the local loop, Official Journal L 336 , 30/12/2000 P. 0004 – 0008; http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000R2887:EN:HTML   
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more common aspects. Market fragmentation through borders between countries remained 
highly relevant and the goal of the EU was to contribute to more harmonization. 
“The EU’s regulatory framework aims to promote free and fair competition, which will 
boost Europe’s economy by supporting every area of activity which relies on telecoms, 
and create a strong telecoms industry in Europe. Consumers will be the ultimate benefi-
ciaries.”
29 
The consideration of more competition included ideas of how to better take account of the 
specificities of markets which exhibit more characteristics of competition. The idea was to do 
so by specifying the methods of defining and analysing markets in line with competition law. 
To that end, the EU commission started to prepare guidelines for market analysis according 
to competition law principles already in 2001  
“The intention of the Guidelines will be to ensure that the use by NRAs of competition law 
principles in an ex-ante environment is consistent with the approach of the Commission 
and national competition authorities (NCAs) in the enforcement of Community competi-
tion law. The Guidelines are expected to draw upon the following documents: the “Guide-
lines on the application of EEC competition rules in the telecommunications sector”, the 
“Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law”, and the “Notice on the application of competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector”. The Guidelines will be based on the exist-
ing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance in 
competition law. More particularly, the appraisal of effective competition will be done us-
ing the principles of Community competition law, under Article 82 of the Treaty, and Arti-
cle 2 of the Merger Control Regulation. The Commission and NCAs will continue to apply 
competition law retrospectively under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, or prospectively under 
the Merger Control Regulation. The use by NRAs of the same principles and methodolo-
gy as the Commission and NCAs will have no effect on market definitions used by the 
Commission and NCAs in competition cases, and vice-versa.”
30 
This led to Draft Guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of significant market pow-
er in March 2001.
31 
Telecommunications regulation also received an increased attention in the scientific litera-
ture. De Streel describes the process that is being applied on the telecommunications sector 
after the EU 2002 review especially with respect to the designation of significant market 
                                                 
29  See http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/current/index_en.htm 
30  See Outline of Guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of market power to be adopted under Article 
14 of the proposed Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services; 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/101-24-mktgl.pdf 
31  See http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/com2001-175-5en.pdf  
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power based on market definition and followed by market analysis. Especially the concept is 
compared to the understanding of SMP in competition law and the author concludes:  
“Even though the new concept of significant market power has been aligned on the anti-
trust concept of a dominant position, competition law and sector-specific regulation do not 
coincide and should not be confused with each other. In general, they should be seen as 
complementary and not as substitutes. The objectives of both instruments tend to con-
verge towards the pursuit of effective competition. The scope of both instruments overlap 
as sector regulation applies to market structures where anti-trust will be inefficient and 
competition policy applies the board to all types of market structure. On the other hand, 
the conditions of intervention vary according to the instruments. The SMP regime is lim-
ited to the market fulfilling certain criteria and then applies generally each time there are 
dominant operators. Competition law is triggered by specific behaviour of the firms (abuse 
of dominant position, agreement on concerted practice, concentration) that should be 
proved to be anti-competitive. Therefore, the burden of proof for an NRA is fairly high in 
selecting a market but becomes quite low to intervene. It is certainly lower than other 
competition law as there is no need to show any specific anti-competitive behaviour.”
32 
In analyzing competitive developments over time, Möschel
33 concludes that sector specific 
regulation may only be required in the future for monopolistic bottlenecks as well as termina-
tion monopolies but can be phased out via sunset clauses otherwise. Previously, the author
34 
argued already in 2004 that due to the competitive developments sector-specific regulation 
had surpassed its peak and should be substituted by general competition law. He sees a 
need for regulation, justified on the basis of competition policy considerations, such as the 
abolition of discrimination-free access to the relevant resource but this type of regulation 
need not be sector-specific or necessarily ex-ante.
35  
In light of the review of the EU Framework in 2007 Psarakis argues that sector-specific regu-
lation "will not be phased out since it can not be perfectly substituted by generic competition 
                                                 
32  De Streel, A.: The New Concept of “Significant Market Power” in Electronic Communications: The hybridisation 
of the sectoral regulation by competition law, in: European Competition Law Review, 2003, Vol. 24/10, p. 539 
33  See Möschel, W.: Der zukünftige Ordnungsrahmen für die Telekommunikation: Allgemeines Wettbewerbsge-
setz statt sektorspezifischer Regulierung!, in: Multimedia und Recht (MMR), 2008, pp. 503. 
34   See Möschel, W.: Regulation and deregulation in telecommunications, in: European Business Organization 
Law Review, 2004, pp. 353-361 
35  See Möschel, W.: The future regulatory framework for telecommunications: General competition law instead of 
sector-specific regulation – A German perspective, in: European Business Organization Law Review, 2009, p. 
158. Knieps (see Knieps, G.: Sektorspezifische Regulierung: Transitorisch oder ad infinitum? in: IFO 
Schnelldienst, Nr. 21/2007, p. 7 ff) argues for a phase out of sector-specific regulation. He claims to consider 
network specific significant market power as the only threshold in criterion for regulation. He furthermore claims 
that regulatory mandates which lack position in the end lead to an over-regulation.  
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law".
36 It is interesting to see that the author compares the two concepts on the one hand by 
stating that they have reached a partial convergence and by stating that competition law con-
tains a number of ex-ante elements whereas sector-specific regulation also "has assimilated 
some of the ex-post deterrence attributes" (p. 457). In concluding the author sees that there 
is a parallel application of the two legal frameworks and that this can rather be complemen-
tary than conflicting, despite some crucial elements that need to be addressed. 
Klotz
37 addresses the impact of the new (at that time) recommendation on relevant product 
and service markets. He discusses the relevance and strength of sector-specific regulation 
vs. competition law and concludes that competition law had a limited role in the past and was 
only applied as a complement in few cases. As one of the identified problems, the duration of 
competition proceedings is mentioned. Due to this and other considerations from the practi-
cal application of competition law he wonders how competition authorities can assume that 
their toolbox is sufficiently effective to handle relevant cases 
Cave and Crowther
38 focus on the transition from regulation to competition law based on the 
EU 2002 reform in the EU. Thereby the process of market definition, market analysis and 
SMP designation is described as well as some cases are quoted. The authors conclude:  
“The question of the respective roles of competition law and regulation, and the related 
(but identical) question of the appropriated areas for ex-post and ex-ante interventions will 
remain a key policy question in regulated industries. Through a discussion of a number of 
cases, the previous sections have attempted to access the continued importance of the 
relevance of the conventional distinction. In the case of electronic communications ser-
vices, a new regime has been devised to impose the distinction with ex-ante regulation 
limited to a subset of markets, “recommended” by the commission, with opportunities for 
the NRAs to add to that list, subject to meeting the three criteria noted above to the Com-
mission´s satisfaction (…). Where dominance is found in the market, subject to ex-ante 
regulation, NRAs can choose remedies from an improved list (…). The sector specific 
communications legislation has explicit policy objective on which NRAs and the commis-
sion can rely in formulating interventions. These include the “promotion of competition”. 
Articles 81 and 82 are associated with no such explicit objectives, and this might lead to 
the adoption of alternative approaches when competition law is applied in regulated sec-
tors” (p. 488).  
                                                 
36    See Psarakis, G.: Sector-specific regulation and competition law in the electronic communications sector 
against the backdrop of the internal market, in: European Competition Law Review (ECLR), 2007, Volume 28 
(8), p. 457. 
37  Klotz, R.: Zu den Folgen und Nebenwirkungen der Deregulierung: Fragen Sie Ihre Regulierungs- und Wettbe-
werbsbehörde. in: Multimedia und Recht (MMR), 2008, p. 709. 
38  Cave, M., Crowther, P.: Pre-emptive competition policy needs regulatory anti-trust, in: European Competition 
Law Review, 2005, Vol. 26/9, pp. 481-490.  
14 
The authors nevertheless are optimistic about the interrelationship because they believe that 
the EU Commission has been prepared to negotiate pro competitive outcomes and thus that 
the market parties will adapt to this procedure but at the end they raise some questions 
which refer to the interrelationship and the use of competition law. 
2.2.2  Design of key regulatory parameters between sector specific regulation and 
competition law - Market definition, analysis and dominance designation 
In July 2000, the European Commission submitted the proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Com-
munications and Networks Services
39 for adoption
40
. This proposed Directive contains, in its 
Article 13 a new definition about significant market power. Pursuant to this definition  
“an undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or 
jointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power to be-
have to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimate con-
sumers.” 
Significant market power is not any longer to be assessed on the basis of percentages of 
market share. This definition is rather unspecific and leaves a number of questions open, e.g. 
how “a position of economic strength” is to be defined?
41 Likewise new is the definition in 
Article 13, paragraph 3,  
“if an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may also be 
deemed to have significant market power on a closely related market, where the links be-
tween the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in one market to be 
leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market power of the undertak-
ing”.  
Also new is the market analysis procedure described in Article 14 where the European 
Commission planned to issue a document on relevant product and service markets, ad-
dressed to the member states. In the annex a list of markets can be found which has to be 
                                                 
39 COM (2000) 393; 2000/0184 ; see also Verrue, R./Grussmann, W.-D.: Electronic Communications – die Infor-
mationsgesellschaft im Übergang zu einem neuen Rechtsrahmen, in Kaspar/Rübig, e-wwworld>2000, Tele-
kommunikation 3 (Wien, 2000) 
40 In the foreground on this Directive are political aims as well as principles, which should be realised within na-
tional level, see Huppertz, C.: “Der institutionelle Rahmen des Telekommunikationsrechts in der EU”, in Kom-
munikation&Recht 8/2001, p. 402.  
41 The wording of the Directive has already been changed. The Member States themselves have criticized the 
unspecific wording. – see Documents of the European Council 7326/1/01, 28.3.2001 and 8208/01, 11.5.2001 
under http://europa.eu.int.  
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included in the initial Commission’s decision on product and service markets. This decision is 
regularly reviewed by the European Commission
42 and identifies those product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector, the characteristics of which are such as 
to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set out in the specific measures, without 
prejudice to markets that are defined in specific cases under competition law. 
Presumably due to the unspecific definition in Article 13 about significant market power and 
because of the intention of the European Commission to be in conformity with the case law 
of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Community it is fore-
seen in Article 14 that the European Commission publishes Guidelines on market analysis 
and the calculation on market power.
43  
The Guidelines have been designed for national regulatory authorities to be used for the fol-
lowing purposes: (1) to identify the geographical dimension of those product and service 
markets identified in the Commission Decision under Article 14 of the Directive; (2) to identify 
relevant product and service markets other than those identified in the Commission’s Deci-
sion, and this in agreement with the Commission; (3) to analyze the characteristics of compe-
tition in both the markets identified in the Commission Decision and in markets that national 
regulatory authorities identify themselves and (4) to identify undertakings in a relevant market 
with significant market power and to impose ex ante measures consistently with the terms of 
the Directives. 
The analysis of these Guidelines shows that their intentions would lead to consistency as 
well as legal security and therefore fulfilling the aims of balanced regulation.
44  At the end it is 
the question about the legal nature of these Guidelines and thus of their enforcement. If there 
is no legal way to enforce these Guidelines, national regulatory authorities may not use them 
or only where they seem to be suitable. This means on the one hand that against the as-
                                                 
42 See also Feiel, W.: Zur Diskussion über das EU-Reformpaket im Bereich der elektronischen Kommunikation, 
in: Medien und Recht Nr. 3/2001, who explains the different criteria for assessing „joint dominance“ in the 
sense of the Framework Directive. 
43 http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/com2001-175-5en.pdf; In a certain way the Euro-
pean Commission is authorized to issue directives to the national regulatory authorities. This could lead to a 
centralisation of decision-making power by European Law instead of National Law; see Huppertz, C., “Der in-
stitutionelle Rahmen des Telekommunikationsrechts in der EU”, in Kommunikation&Recht 8/2001, p. 402 
44 Within two months of the date of adoption of the Decision or any updating thereof, national regulatory authori-
ties shall carry out an analysis of the product and service market identified in the Decision of the European 
Commission, in accordance with the Guidelines. Member States shall ensure that national competition authori-
ties are fully associated with that analysis  
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sumed intention of the European Commission there would be no legal security and on the 
other hand the individual undertaking can’t refer to these Guidelines.  
Also in Article 14 a procedure by which national regulatory authorities must undertake market 
analysis in order to assess whether competition is effective on particular markets is de-
scribed. Where competition is not effective, national regulatory authorities designate relevant 
undertakings as having significant market power and maintain or impose ex-ante obligations 
on those undertakings in order to promote a competitive market. Where competition is found 
to be effective on a specific market, national regulatory authorities must withdraw any such 
obligations. The meaning and consequences of this provision will be discussed in Section 3. 
Because of the requirement of the proposed Directive on a Common Regulatory Framework 
for Electronic Telecommunications Networks and Services where the European Commission 
issues a decision on relevant product and service markets as well as Guidelines on market 
analysis some words should be spent on the Commission’s own practice
45: 
The Commission has adopted a number of decisions under Regulation No. 17 and Regula-
tion No. 4064/89
46 relating to the telecommunications sector. In these decisions the Commis-
sion has identified a number of relevant markets which may be of particular relevance for the 
national regulatory authorities when applying Article 13 of the Framework Directive. 
In the opinion of the European Commission there are two relevant markets within the tele-
communications sector:  
•  the market of services provided to end users (service market) and 
•  the market of access to facilities necessary to provide such services (access market). 
Within these two broad markets definitions further market distinctions may be made depend-
ing on demand and supply side patterns. 
                                                 
45 See Commission Working Document, COM (2001) 175, 28.03.2001, p. 14 
46 Regulation (EEC) no 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, 
p.1, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) no 1310/97 of 30. June 1997, OJ L 180, 9.7.1997, p.1 (here-
after, the “Merger Control Regulation).  
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As regards the fixed services market, the European Commission has defined the relevant 
market as being the market for domestic and international voice and data communications 
services with further segmentation between the voice market and the data market
47. In the 
market for fixed telephony retail services, the Commission had distinguished various ser-
vices: the initial connection, the monthly rental, local calls and long distance calls. These ser-
vices are offered to two distinct classes of consumers, namely, residential and business us-
ers, the latter can be distinguished into two submarkets, one for professional, small firms 
costumers and another for large businesses. With regard to the fixed telephony retail ser-
vices offered to residential users, demand patterns seem to indicate that two main services 
are being offered, traditional fixed telephony services (voice and narrowband data transmis-
sions) on the one hand, and high speed communications services (in the form of xDSL ser-
vices as a description of different forms of broadband connections) on the other hand
48.  
The Commission has found that within the mobile telecommunications sector from a de-
mand-side point of view, mobile services and fixed telephony services constitute separate 
markets. Within the mobile market, evidence gathered from the Commission has indicated 
that the market for mobile telecommunications services encompasses both GSM 900 and 
GSM 1800 and possibly analogue platforms
49.  
Specifically, the Commission has made references in its decisions to the existence of the 
following main markets: (1) international voice-telephony services
50; (2) advanced telecom-
munications services to corporate users
51; (3) standardised low-level packet-switched data-
communications services; (4) resale of international transmission capacity
52; (5) audio-
conferencing; (6) satellite services
53; (7) enhanced global telecommunications services
54; (8) 
                                                 
47 See Commission decision of 20 May 1999, Cégétel + 4 (OJ L 218, 18.8.1999), par. 22. 
48  See Commission Working Document, COM (2001) 175, 28.03.2001, p. 17 
49  Cae No IV/M.1430 – Vodafone/Airtouch, Case No IV/M.1669, Deutsche Telecom/One2One, par 7. Whether 
this market can be further segmented into a carrier (network operator) market and adownstream service mar-
ket should be decided on a case-by-case basis, so the European Commission; see Case No IN/1760, 
Mannesmann/Orange, paras. 8-10, and Case No COMP/M.2053 – Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon, paras 9-10. 
50  Case No IV/M.856 – BT/MCI (II), OJ L 8.12.1997, para. 13. 
51  Case No IV/35.337, Atlas (OJ L 239, 19.9.1996) paras. 5-7, Case No IV/35617, Phoenix/Global/One (OJ L 
239, 19.6.1996), par. 6, Case IV/34.857, BT-MCI (OJ L 223, 27.8.1994), Case No IV/M.802 – Telecom Eir-
eann, par. 22. 
52  Case No IV/M.975 – Albacom/BT/ENI, par. 24. 
53  Case IV/350518 – Iridium, OJ L 16, 18.1.1997. 




55, (9) internet-access services to end users
56; (10) seamless 
pan-European mobile telecommunications services to internationally mobile customers
57 
Although the Commission wants to ensure that its decision about the product and service 
market and its assessment of significant market power corresponds with the case law of the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, the just men-
tioned list of markets is not complete in the sense that all relevant constellations are covered. 
The Commission has decided that all types of infrastructure that can be used of the provision 
of a given service can be counted as “access-market”. Whether the market for network infra-
structure should be divided into as many separate submarkets, as there are existing catego-
ries of network infrastructure, depends on the degree of substitutability among such (alterna-
tive) networks and should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Thereby it should be taken 
out in relation to the class of users to which access to the network is provided. A distinction 
should be made between provision of infrastructure to other operators (wholesale level) and 
provision to end users (retail level). At the retail level, a further segmentation may take place 
between business and residential customers
58. 
Article 13 paragraph 3 of the Framework Directive says:  
“Where an undertaking has significant market power on a specific market, it may also be 
deemed to have significant market power on a closely related market, where the links be-
tween the two markets are such as to allow the market power held in one market to be 
leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the market power of undertaking.” 
This provision is intended to address a market situation comparable to the one that gave rise 
to the Court’s judgement in Tetra Pak II
59. In that case the Court decided that an undertaking 
that had a dominant position in one market, and enjoyed a leading position on a distinct but 
closely associated market, was placed as a result in a situation comparable to that of holding 
                                                 
55  Case No COMP/M.1957 – VIAG Interkom/Telenor Media, par 8. 
56  Case No IV/M.1439 – Telia/Telenor, Case No COMP/JV.46 – Blackstone/CDPQ/Kabel Nordrhein/Westfalen, 
par. 26, Case No COMP/M.1838 – BT/Esat, par. 7. 
57    Case No COMP/M.1975 – Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann, Case No COMP/M.2016 – France Tele-
com/Orange, para. 15. 
58  In applying these criteria, the European Commission has found that, as far as fixed infrastructure is concerned, 
demand for the lease of transmission capacity and the provision of related services to other operators occurs 
at wholesale level; M.1069 – WorldCom/MCI, OJ L 116, 4.5.1999, p.1. 
59  Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951.  
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a dominant position on the markets in question taken as a whole.
60 This is often the case in 
the telecommunications sector, where an operator has a dominant position on the infrastruc-
ture market and a significant presence on the downstream, services market. Under such cir-
cumstances, a national regulatory authority may consider it appropriate to determine that 
such operator has significant market power on both markets taken together. 
Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty, a dominant position can be held by one or more undertak-
ings (“collective dominance”). Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Framework Directive also pro-
vides that an undertaking may enjoy significant market power, that is, it may be in a dominant 
position, either individually or jointly with others.  
The Commission has applied the concept of collective dominance in relation to oligopolistic 
markets. The structure which was considered, is conducive to co-ordinated effects on the 
relevant market, which was adopted in a number of decisions based on the Merger Control 
Regulation. In applying the term of collective dominance, the Commission has examined, 
taking into consideration decisions adopted under Regulation 4064/89 in the telecommunica-
tions sector, whether any of the notified transactions could give rise to a finding of collective 
or oligopolistic dominance. 
To sum up, an incumbent will find it difficult to get away from the regulatory regime regarding 
SMP regulation. Because of the different market structures an incumbent can have signifi-
cant market power on one market as well as – under special circumstances – it can be des-
ignated as having significant market power on associated market(s) also. 
 
                                                 
60   Thanks to its dominant position on the first market, and its market presence on the associated, secondary 
market, an undertaking may thus leverage the market power which it enjoys in the first market and behave in-
dependently of its customers on the latter market. Close associated links, within the meaning of the Court’s 
case-law, will most often be found in vertically integrated markets.  
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2.3  The 2010 Review 
2.3.1  Main elements of the regulatory framework and assessment of balance be-
tween sector specific regulation vs. competition law 
As described above, the 2010 review was initiated in 2006 with a number of different docu-
ments published. The major developments in the 2010 framework are that the framework 
directive and the access directive are revised and integrated into the directive “better regula-
tion”
61 whereas the authorisation directive, the universal service directive and the data protec-
tion directive are revised and summarized as the new directive “Citizen’s Rights”.
62  
In between the 2002 and the 2010 framework the recommendation on relevant product and 
services markets has been revised and in 2007 a new recommendation was published.
63 
Thereby, due to the achievements and the progress of competition, the number of markets 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation has been reduced to 7 thus demonstrating the growing rel-
evance of competition in practice. With respect to the framework and the access directive, 
the rules and the structure of the approach towards regulating markets and the balance be-
tween sector-specific law and competition law in principle remains the same, the major 
changes come from the process of market definition, analysis and dominance designation 
whereas a smaller number of markets is relevant and from access and interconnection.
64 
                                                 
61  Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Direc-
tives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facili-
ties, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, in:  OJ L 337, 
18.12.2009, pp. 37–69 
62  Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Di-
rective 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authori-
ties responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, in:  OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 11–36 
63  Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the elec-
tronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (notified under document number C(2007) 5406), in:  OJ L 344, 28.12.2007, p. 65–69 
64  Haucap and Uhde conclude that the frontiers between competition law and competition policy on the one hand 
and regulation on the other hand are increasingly becoming unblurred. An important aspect is whether compe-
tition law and sector-specific regulation are complementary or competing approaches. The authors hold the 
position that the two measures and approaches complement each other or at least in theory should comple-
ment each other. However, they also find evidence for the opposite, see Haucap, J.; Uhde, A. (2008): Regulie-
rung und Wettbewerbsrecht in liberalisierten Netzindustrien aus Institutionen ökonomischer Perspektive, in: 
ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Vol. 59, pp. 237-262. There are major dif-
ferences between competition law and regulation as regards political goals, the threshold for intervention, the 
frequency of interventions, information and transparency, the use of certain instruments and the cultural ap- 
21 
The changes from the framework in 2002 to the revised framework in 2010 can be summa-
rized as follows showing the elements that changed over time.
65 
Fig. 1: The development of the EU framework 
EU Framework 1998
First market opening 
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This change in the approach implied changes and revisions of a large number of documents. 
Fig. 2: Documents of the EU framework 
























Literature post the decision to adopt the 2010 package has not yet been published to a large 
extent. Comments so far have focused on the goals and scope of the revised rules.
66 Clearly, 
                                                                                                                                                   
proach of authorities. In order to overcome the dichotomy between these two "poles", the authors suggest an 
intermediate approach which they call the "ladder of remedies", p. 257. 
65  Source for figures: SBR Juconomy Consulting.  
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sector specific regulation is not that prominent any longer when looking at the fact that e.g. 
access and interconnection issues are now well established and many markets tend towards 
competition. 
2.3.2  Design of key regulatory parameters between sector specific regulation and 
competition law 
2.3.2.1  Market definition, analysis and dominance designation 
The main aspect of the 2010 framework is that formally, the directives are condensed (see 
above). The revision in detail shows that the focus of the framework in the telecom sector 
moves from a system which regulates competing interests between different operators which 
provide networks and services to a different degree towards a system of managing existing 
competition. The overarching principle is not to create competition any longer but to develop 
the market under competitive conditions. This can also be derived from the fact that the di-
rectives were accompanied by a great number of programmes and initiatives focusing on the 
digital agenda, broadband strategies and spectrum policies. Thus, the EU Commission has 
taken a generic view on the overall markets and amongst others chosen an approach for a 
converging and competitive environment. 
The impact on market definition, analysis and designation is less clear. There are no princi-
ple changes in the approach to conduct market definition and analysis except for procedural 
matters in the national consultation and international coordination mechanism. This may be 
due to the fact that market definition based on the recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets already follow competition law principles. 
2.3.2.2  Access and interconnection 
The revised framework does not contain a significant set of additional provisions on intercon-
nection and access in the “Better Regulation” directive (e.g. on Co-location and sharing of 
network elements and associated facilities for providers of electronic communications net-
works), however, there is secondary legislation which is highly relevant. The EU commission 
                                                                                                                                                   
66  See e.g. Ettmayer M., Das EU-Telekompaket 2009 – Auswirkungen auf Österreich, M&R 5/2010; Forgó N, 
Otto G., Zu den Änderungen des europäischen Rechtsrahmens für die elektronische Kommunikation, M&R 
5/2010.  
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published a recommendation on the calculation of interconnection rates implementing a 
“pure LRIC” approach
67 which – similar to 1998 in detail determines how termination rates 
(which form only a part of all interconnection services whereas the other services (origination 
and transit) are no longer markets defined and susceptible to ex-ante regulation) shall be 
calculated. Furthermore, a recommendation on next generation access networks has been 
made effective which in great detail describes the regulatory approach to access in the new 
types of access networks (FttX).
68 Both documents demonstrate that despite competitive de-
velopment in calls’ and access’ markets sector specific regulation still plays a crucial role and 
increases the degree of detail by which it intervenes. 
                                                 
67    Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU - 
C(2009) 3359 final, in: OJ 124/67, 20.5.2009, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex UriS-
erv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:124:0067:0074:EN:PDF 
68  2010/572/EU: Commission Recommendation of 20 September 2010 on regulated access to Next Generation 
Access Networks (NGA), OJ L 251, 25.9.2010, pp. 35–48, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32010H0572:EN:NOT  
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3 National  Implementation 
3.1 Austria 
Austria moved from monopoly, based on the “Fernmeldegesetz” to competition by transpos-
ing the measures agreed on the European level into national legislation with the Telecom-
munications act (TKG) in 1997. This law entered into effect on 1 August 1997, slightly ahead 
of the date of full liberalisation. It was amended several times in the subsequent years.
69 The 
2002 European regulatory framework for communications was transposed in Austria by 
means of the Telecommunications Act 2003 (TKG 2003) which took effect on August 20, 
2003 as member states had 15 months to transpose the new EU framework into national 
legislation. With this act, regulation has developed from sector-specific regulation towards 
general competition law. In the TKG 2003, the regulatory authorities have been assigned 
new tasks, such as, for example, a number of authorisations to issue ordinances.
70  The dis-
cussion on the implementation of the 2010 framework is ongoing when this paper was pre-
pared. The transposition into national legislation is expected towards the end of 2011. 
3.2 Germany 
In Germany, the Telecommunications 1996 prepared for liberalisation and market opening on 
1 January 1998. The EU framework revision contained in the 2002 package was transposed 
into national law in Germany in 2004, 15 months after the deadline. Currently, the transposi-
tion of the 2010 package in a new Telecommunications Act 2011 is in progress. 
The relationship between sector specific regulation and competition law has always been an 
issue.
71. Ludwigs
72 in discussing the question of parallelism of the two schools goes back to 
1996 where the Telecommunications Act states that competition legislation is not affected by 
the then new Telecommunications Act. In the 2004 Telecommunications Act is more specific 
                                                 
69  See Ruhle, E.-O., Freund, N., Kronegger, D., Schwarz, M.: Das neue österreichische Telekommunikations- 
und Rundfunkrecht, Verlag medien und recht, Wien, 2004, pp. 14. 
70  See http://www.rtr.at/en/tk/Institutionen 
71  See Piepenbrock, H.-J., Schuster, F.: GWB und TKG: Gegeneinander, Nebeneinander oder Miteinander?, in: 
Computer und Recht 2/2002, p. 98-107. 
72 See Ludwigs, M.: Die Rolle der Kartellbehörden im Recht der Regulierungsverwaltung, in: Wirtschaft und Wett-
bewerb (WuW), Nr. 5, 2008, p. 435-550  
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and states that competition legislation applies besides the Telecommunications Act unless 
the Telecommunications Act defines specifically final rules.  
3.3 Specific  topics 
3.3.1  Market definitions and market analysis 
3.3.1.1 Austria 
3.3.1.1.1  Significant market power in the Telecommunications Act since 1998 
While so far the approach of the European Commission has been described, now the imple-
mentation of these rules into the Austrian Telecommunication act will be presented, and 
likewise how the Austrian regulatory authority interpreted the Telecommunication act togeth-
er with the rules of the European Commission.
73  
It was assumed that an undertaking had significant market power if it had a share of more 
than 25% of the relevant product/service or geographical market. However the regulatory 
authority could stipulate that an enterprise with less than 25% of the relevant market had 
significant market power. It could also stipulate that an enterprise with a share of more than 
25% of the relevant market did not have significant market power.  
The regulatory authority should, at the request of an undertaking stipulate by application of a 
company whether it had a significant market power within the meaning of the Telecommuni-
cations Act. The regulatory authority could also do this on its own initiative.  
These determinations were corresponding exactly to the determinations of the Interconnec-
tion Directive. Once per year the regulatory authority should investigate the market position. 
Therefore, the national regulatory authority decided in several decisions about the significant 
market position of Telekom Austria, Mobilkom and max.mobil on the four different markets 
listed below, however, not every market has been analyzed each year. 
The national regulatory authority in Austria at that time defined 4 product markets wherein it 
investigated whether significant market power existed. These markets were: 
                                                 
73  The following remarks concern the Telecommunications Act 1998. This one is revised by the Telecommunica-
tions Act 2003 and will be shortly amended again.  
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1.  Market for public voice telephony over a fixed network 
2.  Market for public voice telephony over a mobile network 
3.  Market for public leased lines over a fixed network. 
4. Market  for  interconnection 
The results of the different decisions can be summarized as follows: 
Fig. 3: Companies with SMP according to regulatory decisions 
Market / Procedure  M1 / 98  M1 / 99  M1 / 01 
Market for public voice te-
lephony over a fixed network 
Telekom Austria   Telekom Austria   Telekom Austria  
Market for public voice te-
lephony over a mobile net-
work 
Mobilkom Austria  
 
Mobilkom Austria  
max.mobil  
--- 
Market for public leased 
lines over a fixed network 
Telekom Austria   Telekom Austria   Telekom Austria  
Market for interconnection  Telekom Austria  
Mobilkom Austria  
Telekom Austria  
Mobilom Austria  
Telekom Austria  
The market share was calculated by the Austrian regulatory authority out of the turnover of 
the enterprise by multiplying the traffic volumes (for voice, mobile and interconnection) by the 
respective price and by the total turnover for leased lines. Also the physical connections 
(number of customer access lines, number of retail mobile customers, number of 64 kbit/s 
equivalents for leased lines) were taken into account but not decisive for the judgement of 
the national regulatory authority
74.   
3.3.1.1.2  Significant market power in the Cartel Law 
Market dominance (Cartel Court): The first determination concerning criminal sanction 
against price rigging could be found in the Austrian Criminal Law 1803 as well as in the Aus-
trian Criminal Law 1852. In 1951 the first anti-trust law was enforced. Followed by many 
amendments the anti-trust law 2005 was enforced on the 1st of January 2006.  
European Guidelines: In 1972 a free trade agreement was entered into between Austria and 
the EWR (in those days). Concerning competition law especially the determinations of arti-
                                                 
74  As is will be shown further on the European Commission uses another method for assessing significant market 
power as the Austrian regulatory authority.  
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cles 101 and 102 are essential.
75 Regarding the Directive 1/03 article 101 and 102 of the 
Treaty must be applied effectively and uniformly in the Community in order to establish a 
system which ensures that competition in the common market is not distorted. In article 3 of 
this directive the precedence of the European law and the application of the national deter-
minations is stated.
76 Article 16 ensures a common level of protection within the member 
states.
77 Those provisions have to be applied by the European Commission as well as na-
tional courts and national office of fair trading. Furthermore, articles 11 to 14 determine a 
stronger cooperation between European Commission and the national (competition) authori-
ties. Therefore, a duty of information and the duty of transferring all national draft texts of 
decisions to the European Commission is foreseen.If a competition authority of a Member 
State is already acting on a case, the Commission shall only initiate proceedings after con-
sulting with that national competition authority. 
National Law (Antitrust Law): First of all it is necessary to underline that not the dominant 
position by itself imposes any sanctions; it is the abuse of such a position that makes sanc-
                                                 
75  Once Art 81 and 82. 
76   Relationship between Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and national competition laws 
  1. Where the competition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law to 
agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 
81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States within the meaning of that provision, they 
shall also apply Article 81 of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices. Where the com-
petition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law to any abuse prohib-
ited by Article 82 of the Treaty, they shall also apply Article 82 of the Treaty. 
  2. The application of national competition law may not lead to the prohibition of agreements, decisions by as-
sociations of undertakings or concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States but which do 
not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty, or which fulfil the conditions of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty or which are covered by a Regulation for the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. 
Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory 
stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. 
  3. Without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 do not 
apply when the competition authorities and the courts of the Member States apply national merger control laws 
nor do they preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective differ-
ent from that pursued by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
77  Uniform application of Community competition law 
  1. When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty 
which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the de-
cision adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national court may assess 
whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This obligation is without prejudice to the rights and obligations 
under Article 234 of the Treaty. 
  2. When competition authorities of the Member States rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 
81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take deci-
sions which would run counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. 
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tions necessary. As long as there is just one undertaking on a market no competition can be 
imposed there, although the undertaking has a dominant position. On the other hand a domi-
nant position can also be imposed if there is only less competition on a certain market. 
If two or three undertakings are active on the same national market, each undertaking has a 
dominant position, if its share of this market is more than 5%. For the calculation of the mar-
ket share it is necessary to define the relevant market. Basically the assessment has to be 
made between the markets of supply and demand as well as between the relevant market 
concerning factual, geographical and temporal aspects. Therefore, following the “concept of 
substitutability” the same factual market can be assumed if a good or service can be re-
placed. This test has to be done by the user of the possible goods or services. 
The Austrian Antitrust Law also contains the notion of “joint dominance”. This is the fact if a 
small group of undertakings is active on the same market. In any of these cases, if one of the 
undertakings is one of the four biggest and together they have a share of more than 80%, but 
the share of each one is above 5%. 
Furthermore, the Austrian Antitrust Law encompasses a so called “superior” dominant mar-
ket position. Here, just the performance of the undertaking is the determining factor. For this 
fact it does not matter if the undertaking has a dominant market position on the relevant mar-
ket. 
Following the Austrian Antitrust Law the court has to take any abuse into account. The abuse 
can have its reasons within unfair costs or in enforcing business transactions. Furthermore 
the law encompasses the following facts which indicate an abuse: restriction of producing, of 
sales or technical development if it is a mischief for the customers; disadvantages of busi-
ness partner, selling products under the acquisition price. 
Due to a request of an undertaking the court has to remedy the abuse. The court can assign 
the undertaking to stop a certain performance; but the court can as well assign the undertak-
ing to set a certain action. Besides that, the cartel court can impose a fine. The court can 
take corrective actions even if the abuse is already over as long as there is qualified interest.  
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3.3.1.1.3  SMP according to the Telecommunications Act 2003 
The Telecommunications Act 2003 (TKG 2003) determines that before an undertaking can 
be qualified as one with significant market power the regulatory authority has to identify the 
relevant national markets subject to sector-specific regulation according to the national cir-
cumstances, in accordance with the principles of general competition law, taking into account 
the requirements of sector-specific regulation. This has to be done within an ordinance, 
which shall be reviewed regularly, however, at two-year intervals at the latest. 
If the regulatory authority intends to define markets of service/product or geographical rele-
vance that differ from those defined in the recommendation of the European Commission, it 
shall follow the procedures referred to in §§ 128 and § 129 TKG 2003.
78 
Following the TKG 2003 an undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, 
either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position of economic strength affording it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers.
79 
Two or more undertakings may be found to be in a joint dominant position if, even in the ab-
sence of structural or other links between them, they operate in a market the structure of 
which is considered to be conducive to coordinated behaviour
80. 
Where an undertaking enjoys significant market power on a specific market, it may also be 
deemed to have significant market power on a horizontally and vertically or geographically 
                                                 
78    The latest ordinance as well as the defined markets herein can be looked up under 
http://www.rtr.at/en/tk/RelevanteMaerkte. 
79  In making an assessment of significant market power of an undertaking the regulatory authority shall consider, 
in particular, the following criteria: (1)  overall size of the undertaking, its size in relation to that of the relevant 
market as well as the changes in the relative positions of the market players in the course of time; (2) high bar-
riers to entry as well as the resulting extent of potential competition, (3) extent of countervailing buying power, 
(4) extent of elasticity of demand and supply; (5) the respective market phase; (6)  technological  advantages; 
(7) any advantages in the distribution and sales networks; (8) economies of scale, economies of scope and 
density; (9) extent of vertical integration; (10) extent of product differentiation; (11)  access  to  financial  re-
sources; (12) control of infrastructure not easily duplicated; (13) general behaviour on the market, such as pric-
ing, marketing policy, bundled products and services or establishment of barriers.  
80  In making an assessment of joint dominance of two or more undertakings the regulatory authority shall use, in 
particular, the following criteria:1. extent of market concentration, the distribution of the market shares and their 
change in the course of time;2. barriers to market entry, the resulting extent of potential competition; 3. extent 
of countervailing buying power;4. existing market transparency; 5. the respective market phase; 6. homogene-
ous products; 7. underlying cost structures; 8. extent of elasticity of demand and supply; 9. extent of technolog-
ical innovation and degree of maturity of the technology; 10. absence of excess capacity; 11. informal or other 
links between the market players; 12. retaliatory mechanisms; 13. extent of incentives for price competition.   
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related market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the market 
power held in one market to be leveraged into the other market, thereby strengthening the 
market power of the undertaking. 
If the regulatory authority identifies in this procedure one or more undertakings as having 
significant market power on the relevant market and that, thus, there is no effective competi-
tion, it shall impose appropriate specific obligations as referred to in § 38 to § 46 or § 47 (1) 
on such undertakings. The specific obligations are: Obligation of non-discrimination (§ 38 
TKG 2003), obligation of transparency (§ 39 TKG 2003), accounting separation (§ 40 TKG 
2003), access to network facilities and network functions (§ 41 TKG 2003), Price control and 
cost accounting for access (§ 42 TKG 2003), Regulatory controls on retail services (§ 43 
TKG 2003), provision of leased lines (§ 44 TKG 2003), obligations of undertakings with sig-
nificant market power as to retail tariffs (§ 45 TKG 2003), carrier selection and carrier pre-
selection (§ 46 TKG 2003). Specific obligations on undertakings already imposed for the rel-
evant market shall be amended or maintained by the regulatory authority according to the 
results of the procedure, taking account of the regulatory objectives. 
What do the Austrian Telecommunication Law and German the Antitrust Law have in com-
mon, where are the differences? We first present a tabular overview on Austria which will be 
followed by the section on Germany.  
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Fig. 4: Features of the Austrian Telecommunications Act with respect to market definition, 
analysis and remedies 
Subject  Telecommunications Act  Antitrust Law 
Market defi-
nition  
The Telecommunications Act 2003 
(TKG 2003) determines that before 
an undertaking can be qualified as 
one with significant market power 
the regulatory authority has to identi-
fy the relevant national markets sub-
ject to sector-specific regulation ac-
cording to the national circumstanc-
es, in accordance with the principles 
of general competition law, taking 
into account the requirements of 
sector-specific regulation. This has 
to be done within an ordinance, 
which shall be reviewed regularly, 
however, at two-year intervals at the 
latest. (§ 36 TKG 2003) 
Within the Antitrust Law is no similar 
proceeding as within the TKG con-
cerning the market definition / de-
marcation. Moreover, the court has 
to find the demarcation in a given 
case. Herein the court has to distin-
guish between the service/product, 
geographical and temporal market. 
In contrast to the Telecommunica-
tions Act the market demarcation 
has to be done from the perspective 
of the opposing  market side. 
Market dom-
inance 
An undertaking shall be deemed to 
have significant market power if, 
either individually or jointly with oth-
ers, it enjoys a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, cus-
tomers and ultimately consumers (§ 
35 (1) TKG 2003) 
 
An undertaking has significant mar-
ket power 1. if there is no or less 
competition or 2. if this undertaking 
has an overwhelming position on the 
market in comparison to other under-
takings on the same market. 
If an undertaking has 1. a market 
share of 30% at least or 2. if the 
market share is more than 5% and 
there are no more than 2 other un-
dertakings on the same market or 3. 
if the market share is more than 5% 
and this undertaking has together 
with 4 other undertakings a market 
position of at least 80% - in all these 
cases the undertaking has to make 
evident that it has no dominant posi-
tion (change of burden of proof)  
Method of 
calculation 
The TKG specifies criteria when an 
undertaking can be qualified as one 
with significant market power. Not all 
of the given criteria have to be ful-
filled. (§ 35 TKG 2003) 
The Antitrust Law also contains crite-
ria to define an undertaking as one 
with significant power. However, the 
provisions of the TKG cannot be 
compared with those of the Antitrust 
Law as the latter has to be applied 
on all kind of different economic sec-
tors whereas the TKG has to be ap-
plied on the telecommunications 
market only.  
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Ex ante / ex 
post 
If the regulatory authority identifies 
one or more undertakings as having 
significant market power on the rele-
vant market and that, thus, there is 
no effective competition, it shall im-
pose appropriate specific obligations 
on such undertakings. Specific obli-
gations on undertakings already im-
posed for the relevant market shall 
be amended or maintained by the 
regulatory authority according to the 
results of the procedure, taking ac-
count of the regulatory objectives. (§ 
37 TKG 2003) 
Following a decision of the Austrian 
Higher Administrative Court deci-
sions regarding the assessment of a 
significant market power can only be 
done ex ante. That means if the 
Higher Administrative Court over-
turns such a decision there will be no 
definitions for this period as the NRA 
cannot decide for a period which is 
in the past. 
The dominant position by itself im-
poses no sanctions after the Anti-
trust Law; it is the abuse of such a 
position that makes sanctions nec-
essary. In comparison to the TKG 
regulatory procedures will be taken 
ex post based on the Antitrust Law. 
 
By comparing the method of defining an undertaking enjoying a dominant market position the 
different effects of the Telecommunications Act and the Antitrust Law can be seen. First of 
all, which has to be underlined is that the Antitrust Law just sanctions a dominant market po-
sition if there is an abuse. The focus of the Antitrust Law is to protect competition whereas 
the focus of the TKG is to create and ensure competition. Therefore the TKG determines that 
it is up to the NRA to impose certain obligations when an undertaking is having significant 
market power. 
Furthermore, the Antitrust Law has to deal with all different kind of economic sectors where-
as the TKG is just for issues concerning telecommunication relevant. The matter of different 




The German Telecommunications Act has transposed the EU framework contents of 2002 
on market definition, analysis and dominance designation into national law. The relevant pro  
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visions are the sections (§) 10-15 of the Telecommunications Act. Additionally, there is a § 
9a which deals with “the new markets” but which has been found to be in violation of the EU 
framework after an infringement procedure at the EU level
81. As prescribed by EU legislation 
the process of regulating specific markets is separated into the steps of market definition, 
market analysis and the levying of remedies (in case significant market power is found to 
exist). Thereby, sections 10-12 of the German Telecommunications Act encompass that 
market definition and analysis has to be undertaken according to the principles of General 
Competition Law. In case significant market power is found, the regulatory authority has to 
levy at least one of the obligations of the access / framework directive upon the dominant 
operator. 
In general competition law, the Federal Cartel Office is responsible for avoiding that a com-
pany can abuse a dominant position. To that end, it conducts merger control but also moni-
tors if organic growth can lead to a strong market position. Section 19 GWB (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen; Act against restraint of competition) lists a number of possi-
bilities of abusive behaviour which the Federal Cartel Office tries to avoid. When investigat-
ing whether an enterprise may enjoy significant market power, the Federal Cartel Office ap-
plies a number of different criteria. One of them is market shares where – simply speaking – 
1/3 is seen as indicator (threshold value) for single dominance, and 50% for joint dominance 
(of three or less enterprises) as well as 2/3 of market shares for 5 or less enterprises (ac-
cording to section 19 para 3 GWB). Except for market shares, the Federal Cartel Office also 
considers criteria like financial strength, access to input and downstream markets, interrela-
tionships with other enterprises, legal or factual barriers to entry, existing or potential compe-
tition etc. as relevant when determining whether significant market power exists. 
3.3.1.2.2  Regulation of SMP 
The German Telecommunications Act differentiates between ex-ante und ex-post regulation 
in the following fashion. There is a methodological perspective as well as a time-perspective. 
Ex-ante and ex-post are first to be differentiated according to the time at which regulation 
intervenes. Ex-ante means regulatory intervention or decision before a certain action takes 
place (e.g. in approval procedures where an SMP operator may not launch a specific product 
                                                 
81  See  http://www.telemedicus.info/urteile/Telekommunikationsrecht/936-EuGH-Az-C-42407-Regulierungsferien-
9a-TKG.html. As Germany will abolish this §9a in the TKG revision 2011 nothing will materialize from the in-
fringement procedure.  
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before it receives explicit approval by the authority) whereas ex-post refers to any regulatory 
action which takes place after such trends / actions are visible on the market. From a meth-
odological point of view however, ex-ante (especially in price regulation) refers to a situation 
where measures are being undertaken which apply a stricter approach for example to the 
determination of costs and prices. In section 29 et seq of the Telecommunications Act which 
describes the approach to price and tariff regulation, ex-ante refers usually to cost orientation 
as a principle and long run average incremental costs as a methodology to determine costs. 
With respect to ex-post measures, the “reasonable” prices are the standard approach (sec-
tion 38 TKG). This again also has links towards general competition law and the principles 
applied there.  
Summarizing the different approaches in the two sectors leads to the following overview: 
Fig. 5: Features of the German Telecommunications Act with respect to market definition, 
analysis and remedies 
  Telecommunications  Act  (TKG)  Competition Law (GWB) / Anti-
trust law 
Market  definition  According to the EU recommen-
dation on relevant product and 
service markets susceptible to ex-
ante regulation. Application of 
competition law principles in mar-
ket demarcation and definition 
Within Antitrust Law there is no 
similar proceeding as within the 
TKG concerning the market defi-
nition / demarcation. The Federal 
Cartel Office has to find the de-




An enterprise which alone or with 
others enjoys a position similar to 
dominance, i.e. a position which 
allows to act to an appreciably 
extent independent of competitors 
and end users (section 11 TKG) 
No or no significant competition or 
enjoying a superior market posi-





According to volumes (access 
lines, minutes,) or sales (reve-
nues). No threshold values that 
exactly trigger regulatory action 
1/3 for single dominance, 50 % for 
joint dominance of <= 3 enterpris-
es, 2/3 for <= 5 enterprises 
Ex-ante vs. ex-
post 
According to time (before and 
after a specific action has oc-
curred) or according to methodol-
ogy (cost orientation vs. reasona-
ble prices) 
According to topic (merger control 
= ex ante) but also ex-post inter-
vention possible  
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3.3.1.3 Comparison 
The design of the sector specific regulation in the telecommunications sector and general 
competition law with respect to the subject of market definition, analysis and regulation of 
SMP is somewhat different in Austria and Germany despite a harmonized EU framework. 
The following differences can be mentioned 
•  The German telecommunications act conducts market definition and analysis 
according to the list of markets given be the EU commission in the recom-
mendation on product and service markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation 
whereas the Austrian telecommunications act transposes that recommenda-
tion into an ordinance issues by the regulatory authority which forms the basis 
for market definition and analysis in Austria; 
•  Both countries have ex-ante and ex-post measures to be applied if SMP is 
found to exist, however, the German system has two facets of ex-ante (time 
as well as methodology) whereas the Austria telecommunications act only 
looks at one of these dimensions. 
•  In competition law, Austria has allocated the tasks to the Cartel Court (despite 
the fact that there is a competition authority, BWB) whereas in Germany an 
independent authority (Federal Cartel Office) is responsible for applying com-
petition law. 
•  The market shares as threshold values according to which the relevant legis-
lation assumes single or joint dominance to exist vary between the countries. 
3.3.2  Organisation of regulatory authorities 
3.3.2.1 Austria 
3.3.2.1.1  RTR and TKK 
Regulatory authorities in Austria are Telekom-Control-Commission (TKK), Rundfunk und 
Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH [RTR-GmbH], KommAustria and Telecommunications Offices.  
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In the following only the TKK and the RTR-GmbH as the relevant bodies for the telecommu-
nication sector will be discussed: 
The Telekom-Control-Commission shall – according to the Telecommunications Act – consist 
of three members who are appointed by the federal government. One member shall belong 
to the judiciary. In appointing this member, the federal government shall consider three can-
didates suggested by the president of the Supreme Court. The other two members shall be 
appointed at the proposal of the Federal Minister of Transport, Innovation and Technology. In 
this respect, it shall be considered that one member shall have relevant technical and the 
other shall have legal and economic expertise. The term of office of the Telekom-Control-
Commission shall be five years. Reappointment shall be permitted.
82 
The Federal Minister of Transport, Innovation and Technology shall appoint a substitute 
member for each member. The substitute member shall take the place of a member if the 
member is prevented from fulfilling his duties.
83 The Telekom-Control-Commission shall take 
decisions at the highest instance. Its decisions shall not be subject to quashing or modifica-
tion by administrative action. A decision by the Telekom-Control-Commission may be ap-
pealed by filing a complaint to the Administrative Court.
84 The competences of the Telekom-
Control-Commission is concluded listed in the Telecommunications Act 2003
85 
The Telekom-Control-Commission shall be based with Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-
GmbH (RTR). The Telekom-Control-Commission shall be managed by Rundfunk und Tele-
kom Regulierungs-GmbH. Within the framework of their activities on behalf of the Telekom-
Control-Commission the staff of Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH shall be bound 
by the instructions of the chairperson or the member designated in the rules of procedure.
86 
Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH shall perform all duties conferred to the regula-
tory authority by this Federal Act and the ordinances issued under this Federal Act unless the 
Telekom-Control-Commission or KommAustria have competence.
87 
                                                 
82  § 118 (1) TKG 2003. 
83  § 118 (2) TKG 2003. 
84  § 121 (5) TKG 2003. 
85  § 117 TKG 2003. 
86  § 116 (2) TKG 2003. 
87  § 115 TKG 2003.  
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3.3.2.1.2 Cartel  Court 
In Austria the Higher Regional Court acts as cartel court for the whole federal territory. It is 
organised in civil senates. Within a senate works a judge who has the chair, another judge 
and two lay judges. Decisions of the cartel court can be appealed at the Supreme Court. 
At the cartel court a public trial will only be held if one party applies therefore. The Public At-
torney for Cartel Matters [Bundeskartellanwalt] as well as the Federal Competition Authority 
[Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde] are involved in a trial even if they are not an applicant party. 
The Federal Competition Authority (Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, BWB) is organised at a 
government department (Ministry of Economy). As advisory body a commission is organised 
at the Federal Competition Authority.  
Under the focus of Antitrust Law the Federal Competition Authority has to ensure competition 
as well as compatibility of the European Community Law and the decisions of the NRAs. 
Therefore, it has the possibility to apply at the Cartel Court. The Federal Competition Authori-
ty should only intervene when the court is not responsible. 
The Public Attorney for Cartel Matters is also organised at a government department (law). It 
is the representative of all public interest concerning competition at the cartel court. The main 
part of leading a case should be in the hand of the Federal Competition Authority whereas 
the Public Attorney for Cartel Matters has a “corrective role”; its main focus is to ensure the 
application of the law.  
The Commercial Court is as well as the Cartel Court a court which applies civil law. The 
judges at the Commercial Court decide mainly as judge sitting singly. Against decisions of 
the Commercial Court the Supreme Court can be invoked. 
The Commercial Court applies the Act Against Unfair Competition. This law following the 
court can be invoked (besides others) for any disputes between business partners which 
result out of their cooperation. Hence, the court can be invoked in cases when out of the ac-
tion another law is impinged. So it comes that the Commercial Court might have to deal with 
issues concerning telecommunications law.  
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3.3.2.2 Germany 
3.3.2.2.1 Federal  Network  Agency 
The responsibility for sector-specific regulation in the German telecommunications sector 
rests with the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur; BNetzA). This is an authority 
which is an independent regulatory body but from an organisational point of view is under the 
Federal Ministry of Economics. Its organisation as well as its tasks and its responsibilities are 
laid down in the Telecommunications Act, specifically in the section 116 et seq. The roles 
and possibilities with respect to interventions in the market are contained in section 126 et 
seq. The decisions of the Federal Network Agency are taken by so-called Ruling Chambers 
which are organised according to the topics that the authority deals with (telecommunica-
tions, postal issues, electricity, gas, railways). The Federal Network Agency has a council 
which contains the representatives of the 16 Federal States. Furthermore, it also has a scien-
tific council which supports the work of the Federal Network Agency from a scientific per-
spective. Decisions of the Regulatory Authority can be appealed at the Administrative Courts.  
3.3.2.2.2 Federal  Cartel  Office 
In general competition law the decision making body is the Federal Cartel Office (Bun-
deskartellamt). It deals with matters relating to the issues of competition law and investigates 
cases with respect to the abuse of significant market power respectively merger control. Like 
BNetzA, the Federal Cartel Office is an independent authority, but organisationally is situated 
in the area of responsibility of the Federal Minister of Economy. 
The Federal Cartel Office takes its decisions in a similar fashion as BNetzA, by ruling divi-
sions (in German language the BNetzA has “Beschlusskammern” whereas the BKartA has 
“Beschlussabteilungen”) There are 12 ruling divisions in the Federal Cartel Office. 
3.3.2.3 Comparison 
Looking at the organisational structure of the regulatory system the following can be noted 
•  Austria has integrated the regulation of telecommunications and broadcasting 
on an institutional level at RTR as a think tank. In Germany, these two indus-
tries and their regulation are wide apart, however, Germany has integrated  
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energy (power and gas) as well as railways into one “Network Agency”. These 
are still separate regulators in Austria. However, in Germany, broadcasting is-
sues are being dealt with separately on the state level. 
•  Austria works with Courts in competition law despite the fact that there is a 
competition authority. In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office has a more prom-
inent role in applying the relevant legislation. 
3.3.3  Potential conflicts of competence 
3.3.3.1 Austria 
As demonstrated above not only the NRA can be called upon matters concerning telecom-
munications law, in certain cases also the Cartel Court or the Commercial Court can be in-
voked. As a consequence out of this the following abstract analyses if there can be a jurisdic-
tional conflict. 
For the question if there is a jurisdictional conflict it is relevant that there is the same request. 
This can be possible in the case of the abuse of a dominant market position. Basically, jus-
tice and administration are separated after the principle of separation of power. Neverthe-
less, the Constitutional Court stated that in general it is impossible that the decision of a court 
will be controlled by an administrative organ and vice versa. But this does not mean that a 
court and an administrative organ cannot judge the same question. 
Contrarily the Supreme Court stated that it is prohibited that a court and an administrative 
organ judge the same question. 
In general, it has to be distinguished between a positive and a negative jurisdictional conflict.  
A positive jurisdictional conflict is on hand if two or more authorities think they are responsi-
ble; whereas a negative jurisdictional conflict is on hand if no authority claims its responsibil-
ity.  
In Austria the Constitutional Court is responsible to clarify a jurisdictional conflict. Therefore it 
is decisive that the subject is identical. The law does not contain any further explanations for 
this term. Although it has to be proven within each case it can be said that a subject is identi-
cal if the same legal provision has to be applied to the same facts and circumstances. That  
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means if the complainant has the same request at the NRA, the cartel court and the com-
mercial court. Therefore, it cannot be the same subject if a case has to be proofed against 
the background of different legal provisions. However, this is the fact if the NRA, the cartel 
court or the commercial court investigate a certain case – for example the abuse of a domi-
nant market position. Even if the request is the same the different authorities investigate the 
case from different angles - not least because the provisions, the focus of the investigation, 
the legal consequences and the enforcement are different. 
As there is no jurisdictional conflict between the NRA, the Cartel Court and the Commercial 
Court another question should be analysed. It is the question if there is a commitment effect 
between the decisions of the NRA, the Cartel Court and the Commercial Court.  
The Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the court is bound to notifications of an adminis-
trative authority. The court can interrupt a proceeding if a preliminary question comes up. It is 
a prerequisite, however, that the preliminary question is already pending in an administrative 
proceeding. In the contrary case, that means if there is no administrative proceeding already 
dealing with the preliminary question for the trial at court, the court itself has to decide even 
this question. 
Nevertheless, a commitment effect can only be affirmed concerning administrative acts 
which are legally binding. Furthermore, within the administrative proceeding as well as at the 
court the same litigants are a requirement for the commitment effect. 
3.3.3.2 Germany 
From the German constellation it cannot be excluded that a specific topic is viewed different-
ly by the competition authority and BNetzA each in applying the relevant legislation. To avoid 
this, section 123 of the Telecommunications Act prescribes that the two regulatory authorities 
are to work towards a unified approach and decision making process. This should limit con-
flicts with respect to decision making. A possibility can be found in the case that BNetzA de-
clares itself non responsible and that the Cartel Office steps in to investigate the case.  
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Furthermore, the relationship between the contents of the Telecommunications Act and 
competition law is addressed in section 2 of the Telecommunications Act.
88 
3.3.3.3 Comparison 
As a result of the explanations above it seems that there is no major difference between Aus-
tria and Germany concerning this issue. 
3.3.4 Enforcement 
3.3.4.1 Austria 
Unless otherwise provided by the TKG 2003, the Telekom-Control-Commission shall apply 
the General Administrative Procedures Act 1991 [Allgemeines Verwaltungsver-
fahrensgesetz]. That means that each proceeding closes with a notification. There are more 
than one possible ways to enforce a notification of the NRA: 
1. TKG 20003 
Regarding § 109 (2) Z 9 TKG 2003 those who violate an ordinance or a notice issued under 
this Federal Act shall be guilty of an administrative offence and shall be punished by a fine of 
up to Euro 8,000.--. Furthermore, any person who contrary to the market analysis process 
did not take part in the defined way shall be guilty of an administrative offence and shall be 
punished by a fine of up to Euro 58,000.--. 
If the regulatory authority establishes that an undertaking has gained economic advantage 
due to an unlawful act in violation of this Federal Act or the provisions of an ordinance or a 
notice issued under this Federal Act, the regulatory authority may file apply to the Cartel 
Court to fix an amount and skim it off. In the process, the Cartel Court shall be bound by the 
regulatory authority establishing the existence of an unlawful act. The amount to be skimmed 
off shall depend on the extent of the economic advantage and may be set by the Cartel Court 
to be up to 10% of the undertakings turnover of the preceding year. The regulatory authority 
shall be a party to these proceedings. 
                                                 
88  See Schuster, F.: Commentary on section 2 para 3 of the German Telecommunications Act, in: Beck’scher 
TKG Kommentar, 3
rd edition, Munich 2006, pp. 157  
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2. Law administration enforcement 
The law foresees the enforcement of act or default with substitute performance or coercive 
enforcement penalty. The law determines an amount of only EUR 726,- for such a penalty. 
The imposition of the sanction can be brought into question. 
3. Execution 
A notification can only be executed if the execution itself is assigned to the court by law. As 
there is no appropriate determination in the Telecommunications Act 2003 decisions by the 
NRA cannot be executed by the court. 
4. Civil Law 
There is the possibility to claim for damages. Therefore a damage has to be established. 
This might be the most difficult part.  
Besides that the Cartel Court has the possibility to impose a fine in specific cases. The high-
est fine which can be imposed is by 10% of the turnover a year ago respectively 5% of the 
average daily sales. 
3.3.4.2 Germany 
With respect to the enforcement of regulatory decisions, applicants respectively parties to a 
case in which the Federal Network Agency has ruled and which are trying to enforce their 
rights have (in case the other party of the case does not fulfil its obligations) two possibilities. 
They can bring up the case again at the Federal Network Agency which then is in a position 
to decide upon penalties for parties which do not act in accordance with the Telecommunica-
tions Act (section 149 TKG) or specific decisions of the Federal Network Agency or they can 
launch a civil dispute at the regular courts against a party which does not fulfil its obligations. 
The powers of the Federal Cartel Office are laid down in section 32 GWB and cover prelimi-
nary measures, the possibility to levy specific obligations, the revocation of a previously 
granted merger, and sector investigations. In addition, the Federal Cartel Office may impose 
fines for violations of competition law of up to 10% of annual worldwide turnover of the under-
taking concerned. A violation of obligations levied according to section 32 GWB can imply 
further measures such as e.g. compensation according to section 33 GWB.  
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3.3.4.3 Comparison 
As well as in Austria also in Germany decisions of the NRA can be enforced. In both coun-
tries it seems to be a question of the effectiveness of the sanction measures. It gives the im-
pression that the legislator didn’t focus on the enforcement of decisions of the NRA from the 
outset. 
3.3.5 Margin  Squeeze 
As competition problems can arise from discriminatory behaviour of vertically integrated op-
erators discriminating their wholesale customers by margin-squeezes, these are of high im-
portance to sector-specific regulation and competitions law as well as regulatory authorities. 
The following paragraph compares the approaches by the Austrian and German regulator 
regarding the prevention of margin-squeezes, respectively. 
3.3.5.1 Germany   
The German regulatory authority started a discussion on the matter based on the Telecom-
munications Act of 2004. The German act contains a provision in article 27 which requires 
price regulation to be consistent. According to section 27 article 1, price regulation shall 
avoid abuse, discrimination of end users and competitors through measures of enterprises 
enjoying significant market power. This is done through BNetzA’s consistency check in sec-
tion 27 article 2, i.e. a mechanism by which BNetzA ensures that price regulation measures 
are all done according to similar methodology and principles as applicable. The regulatory 
authority has published several papers on the way it applies the section 27, inter alia consid-
ering consistency between wholesale and retail prices, consistency between different busi-
ness models (consistency of different wholesale prices as a prerequisite for alternative busi-
ness models) and consistency in relation to technological change
89.  
Subsequent to the provision on a generally spoken consistent regulation of prices, the Ger-
man Telecommunication Act also contains a more specific provision with respect to price-
cost-squeeze. This is embedded in section 28 addressing abusive behaviour of SMP opera-
tors. Article 1 defines abusive behaviour. Article 2 then addresses margin squeeze (the act 
                                                 
89 See Bundesnetzagentur: Hinweise zur konsistenten Entgeltregulierung i.S.d. § 27 Abs. 2 TKG, Endfassung, 
4.11.2009, see www.bnetza.de.  
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uses the German term: price cost squeeze) by saying that there is an abuse if SMP opera-
tors charge a price for a wholesale service whereby the difference between this wholesale 
price and the respective retail price is not sufficient to allow an efficient enterprise to earn a 
reasonable return on investments in the end user market.
90  
Based on Section 28, article 2, the German regulatory authority has published some infor-
mation and observations
91 which can be regarded as position papers but which are no formal 
decisions. Thereby, it discusses a number of relevant aspects including e.g. the definition of 
an efficient competitor and the determination of its costs and revenue situation. Another as-
pect discussed is the outcome on regulation depending on whether the relevant retail prices 
are regulated or not.
92 Further discussions deal with the question of how to compare retail 
and wholesale prices. Due to the fact that on the wholesale level there are a large number of 
different wholesale products, the competitor is able to “produce” retail services using a varied 
set of wholesale products (product bundles in the retail markets based on one single whole-
sale offer). As the German Telecommunications Act also contains a provision regarding ex-
post control of abuse (in section 38), this approach needs also to be taken into consideration. 
Some major conclusions of BNetzA are: 
1.  Relevant for the margin-squeeze assessments are the costs of an efficient competitor 
and thereby the cost situation of the competitor shall be taken into consideration, howev-
er, the term “efficient competitor” is not to be interpreted in the sense of “efficient busi-
ness model”. The goal of the approach is to allow competition on a nationwide scale 
through efficient competitors, however, this does not imply that every business model 
needs to be “safeguarded” against competition by SMP operators.
93  
2.  BNetzA is reluctant to assume that an efficient competitor will have higher costs in the 
long run than the incumbent operator. Despite differences in scale (and scope), there 
                                                 
90  For a broader discussion of the subject see Rädler, P.: Die Preis-Kosten-Schere im Kartell- und Regulierungs-
recht, in: Computer und Recht (CR), Nr. 12/2010, pp. 780. which discusses the impact of sector specific regu-
lation and general competition law on situations with price cost squeezes. 
91  See „Hinweise zu Preis-Kosten-Scheren i.S.d. § 28 Abs. 2 Nr. 2 TKG“, 14.11.2007, www.bnetza.de 
92  Due to the increased competition in a number of markets, several retail markets have already been liberalised 
in Germany and thus, operators on these markets are free to set retail prices without any regulatory interven-
tion. There is a significant difference as to whether price-cost-squeezes are analysed against the background 
of regulated or non-regulated prices. 
93  As cost analysis of competitors are difficult to undertake, a proxy for competitors costs are the wholesale prices 
/ costs of the SMP operators. In the end this means that the efficiency of the SMP operators is transposed to-
wards the competitor.  
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may also be cost advantages due to the use of more modern technology. Therefore, the 
analysis of the competitive effects needs to be undertaken in a long term perspective. 
When assessing margin-squeezes so far, the BNetzA has generally, but not exclusively 
used the costs of the incumbent.
94 
3.  BNetzA considers it necessary to decide on a case by case basis whether or not price-
cost-squeeze tests shall be applied to specific markets or to tariffs applicable across 
markets.  
4.  In cases of bundles which contain regulated and non-regulated prices, a simple price-
cost-squeeze test is not applicable.  
BNetzA has dealt with margin-squeeze tests within several regulatory procedures to approve 
regulated prices, mostly related to Bitstream Access prices. Thereby, BNetzA has mainly 
relied on the costing information provided by the incumbent, but has e.g. also regarded the 
costs of the competitors for IP-Peering/Transit. These price squeeze tests have only regard-
ed the access to internet with or without shared access of the local loop. Hence, the bundles 
including voice products have not been looked at. In all cases regarding bitstream access, 
the BNetzA has not found any margin-squeeze based on the tariffs it has approved.
95 
As can be seen, these issues and strategies of BNetzA with respect to price cost squeeze 
are described in a rather generic way. It is left to each single case which is brought to BNet-
zA to be analysed specifically and the decisions then to be taken by the regulatory authority. 
The number of cases in which margin squeeze considerations where decisive for price regu-
lation is relatively small although many expert opinions were submitted to BNetzA. Rather, 
BNetzA has used the principle of cost orientation as the guiding rule for setting prices. 
3.3.5.2 Austria 
In Austria margin squeeze tests have had more influence as they have been a decisive ele-
ment in specific regulatory decisions for a number of years. Due to significant price decreas-
es in various fixed markets the authority realised early on that there is a discrepancy be-
tween the retail prices on one hand and the related costs and wholesale prices on the other. 
                                                 
94  BNetzA Decision BK3-09-044 
95  Ibid.  
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When the incumbent operator started to significantly reduce its prices for vice broadband 
bundles in 2007 it became obvious that the retail prices (on the basis of the copper access 
network) were lower than the overall costs. Therefore, the regulatory authority moved to-
wards determining the prices for unbundled local loops on the basis of margin squeeze tests, 
which resulted in lower margin squeeze free prices than what would have been the case if 
prices had set based on forward-looking long run average incremental costs (FL-LRAIC) or 
fully allocated costs (FAC). The result was inter alia a reduction in the price for unbundled 
local loops from 10,70 Euros to approximately six Euros per month (further reduced later on). 
Other elements that triggered a stronger relevance of margin squeeze were e.g. the prices 
for bitstream access where retail minus has already been applied to determine prices previ-
ously.  
The legal basis for price regulation is article 42 of the Austrian Telecom Act which allows the 
regulatory authority to levy obligations upon SMP operators with respect to cost coverage 
and price control incl. the obligation to offer cost oriented prices. Such obligations can be 
levied in case the SMP operator is in a position to charge excessive prices and/or to practice 
price discrimination and margin-squeeze.  
In 2009, an additional provision was introduced in section 42 article 1 of the law which states 
that the investment of the operator are to be taken into account enabling a reasonable return 
on the investments under consideration of the associated risks and future market develop-
ments. Specifically, costs and risks for new communications networks are to be considered. 
Section 42 article 2 then contains the provision of cost orientation for SMP operators, using 
the principle of the costs of efficient service provision. The regulatory authority may also use 
(cost) data independent from the regulated operator. Further obligations which can be im-
posed regards the cost calculation method which can be levied (section 42 article 3). 
For the Austrian regulator margin squeeze tests are at the borderline between sector specific 
regulation and general competition law. In the area of sector-specific regulation margin 
squeeze tests are used in an ex-ante manner based on forecast volumes, costs and reve-
nues (fully allocated costs). It is not only checked  whether individual products cover their 
avoidable cost (plus the wholesale price) but also if the sum of products (e.g. all broadband 
products) cover total costs (plus the wholesale price). In the area of general competition law 
margin squeeze tests are used ex-post to assess potential discrimination considering the  
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avoidable costs, calculated based on realized costing data, revenues, transfer charges and 
volumes. 
The Austrian regulatory authority organised a symposium on the matter in May 2010 where 
the general aspects of the margin-squeeze calculation were discussed. It showed that the 
Austrian regulatory authority already has in depth looked at a number of issues in certain 
proceedings and that is also an element of its practical work. The following aspects shall be 
mentioned
96. 
1.  Use of the “as efficient” competitor test versus the “reasonably efficient competitor” test. 
2. Development of a calculation methodology and calculation principles to determine 
whether or not margin squeeze can be found
97. 
Fig. 6: Price Cost Squeeze tests in Austria 
 
                                                 
96  See Solé, E.: Margin Squeeze – bisherige Überlegungen der TKK, and Schwarz, A.: Margin Squeeze – (neue) 
Herausforderungen, both retrieved from www.rtr.at (6 December 2010) 
97  See Schwarz, A., p. 4.  
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The Austrian regulatory authority conducts margin squeeze tests on an ongoing basis follow-
ing the principles and methods described above.
98 The Austrian regulatory authority has also 
started to consider relevant issues with respect to future topics
99.  
With respect to next generation access networks, the Austrian regulatory authority has al-
ready been considering several topics such as the fact that one specific wholesale service 
can be used for the provision of several retail services. Furthermore, the issue of consistency 
(called “congruence” in the RTR paper) between wholesale and retail prices is being dis-
cussed e.g. with respect to the (1) possibility to differentiate prices for wholesale services, (2) 
flatrates on the wholesale level and (3) deregulation respectively margin squeeze tests not to 
be applied any longer where sustainable competition exists. With respect to consistency in 
terms of NGA, the relevant issues focus on physical unbundling on various levels of the val-
ue chain (MDF, street cabinet etc.), virtual unbundling, access to ducts and dark fibre, bit-
streaming as well as potential unbundling of fibre optical access networks. This means that in 
terms of next generation access networks the relevance of margin squeeze tests will in-
crease and new questions will arise, especially with respect to new technologies and their 
costs, as well as the bundling of products and services and the high share of joint and com-
mon costs. On this matter the Austrian regulatory authority also published a paper
100 showing 
that the Austrian regulatory authority has taken a strong role in determining issues with re-
spect to margin squeeze. 
3.3.5.3 Comparison 
When comparing the two countries regarding margin squeeze approaches by the regulatory 
authority, the following springs to mind 
•  The German Telecommunications Act contains a specific provision on price cost 
squeeze and BNetzA has developed a policy paper. When it comes to regulatory de-
                                                 
98  Based on its own experience and case law from the European Union, the following guidelines are being ap-
plied by the Austrian regulatory authority: (1) The costs and prices of the operator with significant market power 
is the relevant benchmark; (2) For short term promotions, variable costs are representing the absolute mini-
mum threshold; (3) For the calculation of the relevant period, this is decided on a case by case basis. This is 
specifically relevant for the calculation of one time costs which are then distributed over a longer period of time; 
(4) Analysis of bundled products and product moves are specifically allowed. 
99 See Schwarz, A.: Margin Squeeze – (neue) Herausforderungen, see www.rtr.at 
100 See RTR: Margin-Squeeze-Überprüfungen in der sektorspezifischen Ex-ante-Regulierung der Telekommuni-
kationsmärkte – kritische Punkte und neue Herausforderungen, see www.rtr.at  
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cisions, the relevance of price cost squeeze tests has been limited to the regulation of 
bitstream access, where the margin squeeze tests have had a limited influence on 
the regulated prices. 
•  The Austrian Telecommunications Act does not contain provisions regarding price 
cost squeeze, however, numerous decisions of the authority are guided by the appli-
cation of this principle. 
•  Both authorities have published papers (“policies”) on price cost squeeze whereby 
some deviations can be found e.g. with respect to the applicability of the “as efficient 
competitor” test. Also, we find that the Austrian authority has developed specific rules 
for calculation purposes and also has in mind the potential price cost squeeze issues 
arising from NGA whereas the German authority uses general policy statements and 
leaves the specific application to cases it has to decide. 
In summary, the price cost squeeze concept is more relevant in Austria and thus also the 
competition law principle that goes along with it, which is a consequence of the fact that a 
larger number of markets have been freed from regulation due to the finding of effective 
competition.  
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4 Conclusions:  harmonisation  vs. national implementation 
After a detailed overview on specific items in the German and Austria legislation as re-
gards the telecommunications sector and its regulation and the relevance of competition 
law the following general conclusions can be drawn 
•  In sector specific regulation for electronic communications as well as for com-
petition law, EU member states have defined a unified approach to be applied. 
The relevant EU framework has been transposed into national legislation 
•  The analysis of the rules in Germany and Austria shows that despite this har-
monization on the EU level, national implementation can be quite different. 
Such differences between Germany and Austria can be found with respect to 
the following items  
i.  Market definition and market analysis as well as the finding of SMP fol-
low a principle pattern but the details of implementation are quite dif-
ferent e.g. as regard the legal basis and the procedures that are being 
followed. 
ii. The organization of the regulatory authorities differs substantially. 
There are differences in terms of institutional convergence (Austria 
combines telecoms, postal (rather recently) and broadcasting (but not 
energy or railways), Germany combines telecoms, postal matters 
(since the beginning), energy, railways (but not broadcasting) and also 
the process of decision making is quite different. 
iii.  Regarding margin squeeze there are some common approaches but 
the legal grounds as well as the implementation of margin squeeze 
tests displays differences. 
iv.  With respect to competition law, the two countries apply different sys-
tems with respect to responsible institutions and also the approach e.g. 
with respect to joint dominance is not identical.  
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•  As one can find these differences one may ask to which degree this affects 
market developments. Obviously, the markets have developed competition in 
the telecoms sector, with different results so. This may also be impacted by 
the legal and regulatory environment. At least the analysis shows that a com-
mon and harmonized EU framework by no means is a guarantee of a harmo-
nized implementation on the level of member states. It also shows that com-
petition law continues to be highly relevant despite changes in sector specific 
legislation in a dynamic sector. In this sense, one could support Lehofer’s hy-
potheses with respect to the continued relevance of competition law irrespec-
tive of whether sector specific regulation is becoming more or less important. 
 